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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to further the study of motive-goal congruence. 
Research on motive-goal congruence has only assessed congruence as a normative 
variable. The present research was conducted to replicate previous findings relating 
normative congruence to well-being, to assess the predictive strength of ipsative 
congruence, and to assess for whom congruence increases over time. In this study three 
hypotheses were tested: (1) that normative congruence would predict change in well­
being, (2) that ipsative congruence would account for change in well-being above and 
beyond normative congruence, and (3) that the interaction of motives and mindfulness 
would predict change in goals. Motives, goals, and life-satisfaction were assessed every 
week for five weeks. Trait mindfulness was also assessed. The repeated measures design 
allowed for the treatment of congruence as both a normative variable and an ipsative 
variable.
The first and third hypotheses received support. Normative motive-goal 
congruence predicted change in life-satisfaction for achievement-approach motives and 
goals and achievement-avoidance motives and goals. Ipsative motive-goal congruence 
negatively predicted change in life-satisfaction for power-avoidance motives and goals. 
This relationship between ipsative congruence and well-being was in the opposite 
direction of what had been predicted and therefore failed to support the hypothesis. 
Finally, the interaction between the achievement-approach motive and mindfulness 
predicted change in achievement-approach goals. Also, the interaction between the 
power-approach motive and mindfulness predicted change in power-approach goals. The 
first set of results is consistent with previous findings that motive-goal congruence 
predicts well-being. Secondly, the negative relationship documented between ipsative 
congruence and well-being in the power-avoidance domain contributes a new avenue of 
study to motive-goal research. Ipsative congruence should be further explored, and 
additional research should address how and why congruence may differ across motive 
domains and valences. Finally, the documented relationship between mindfulness, 
motives, show that congruence increases for people who are more mindful.
MOTIVE-GOAL CONGRUENCE: NORMATIVE CONGRUENCE, IPSATIVE 
CONGRUENCE AND MINDFULNESS
INTRODUCTION
This research was conducted with three major aims. The first aim was to replicate 
the previous finding that motive-goal congruence predicts well-being. Motive-goal 
congruence is the degree to which an individual’s motives and goals correspond in 
content. The second aim was to extend previous research on motive-goal congruence by 
assessing congruence not only as a normative variable, but also as an ipsative variable, 
and to assess whether ipsative congruence has predictive power above and beyond 
normative congruence. Previous research has relied solely on a normative approach, in 
which an individual’s congruence is based on where one’s motives and goals are located 
relative to group norms. It is important to assess an individual’s congruence as it is 
grounded relative to how that individual’s motives and goals vary over time. The third 
aim of this research was to demonstrate that mindfulness predicts change in congruence. 
If motive-goal congruence positively predicts well-being, it is beneficial to assess for 
whom increases in motive-goal congruence occur. It is proposed in this research that 
people who are mindful should display increases in their motive-goal congruence. 
Motives
Murray began the motive tradition in psychological research by identifying the 
underlying needs that guide people to engage in general need-satisfying behaviors. 
Murray’s theory of motives stemmed from Freud’s theoretical grounding in the 
unconscious. Murray thought of motives and needs as underlying or latent inclinations 
that differ across individuals (Thrash & Elliot, 2001). A motive is a lasting predisposition
2
3oriented toward certain incentives (Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Grassmann, 1998). 
McClelland sought to rigorously operationalize these underlying motivation systems. 
McClelland, Koestner, and Weinberger (1989) identified three underlying motivations 
that differ in strength across individuals: need for achievement, need for affiliation, and 
need for power. McClelland and Koestner (1992, p. 144) defined need for achievement as 
the “need to do something better than before and surpassing standards of excellence.” 
Need for affiliation is defined as the need to establish, maintain or restore relationships 
(Boyatzis, 1973). Need for power is defined as the need to have influence over others 
(McClelland, 1973).
In addition to these three types of motives, motivation can also be categorized as 
approach motivation or avoidance motivation. Elliot and Thrash (2002) noted that 
approach motivation is marked by appetitive behavior prompted and propelled by the 
possibility of desirable events, and avoidance motivation is marked by avoidant behavior 
prompted and propelled by the possibility of undesirable events. Each of the motive 
domains (achievement, affiliation, and power) can have either an approach or avoidance 
valence -  for instance, one can have an achievement-approach motive, a power- 
avoidance motive, as well as any other combination. Individuals can have many motives 
that vary in domain and valence.
What Murray and McClelland originally defined as a motive in recent research 
has been reconeptualized as an implicit motive. Implicit motives are contrasted with 
explicit motives. Furthermore, explicit motives are to a certain extent similar to the 
concept of goals. The present study concerns motives and goals, which are concepts that 
are similar to implicit and explicit motives. Research on implicit-explicit motive
4congruence is abundant and provides a conceptual basis for the recently emerging 
motive-goal congruence research.
McClelland, Koestner and Weinberger (1989) defined implicit motives as 
affective associative networks. Specifically, implicit motives are emotion-based, 
spontaneous predispositions to react to incentives that yield positive or negative affect for 
a person (Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Grassmann, 1998). Implicit motives result from 
emotional learning of incentives, rewards, and punishments. Theorists report that all 
motives are partly learned; specifically, implicit motives are learned experientially at an 
early, pre-language age when there are salient emotional cues for incentives and rewards 
(Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Grassmann, 1998; Hofer & Chasiotis, 2003; Schultheiss & 
Brunstein, 1999; Thrash & Elliot, 2001). These early-learned affective associations 
become incorporated into one’s personality and are considered to be largely unconscious 
and to function automatically (Hofmann, Gschewendner & Schmitt, 2005). In accordance 
with the unconscious and automatic nature of implicit motives, implicit motives predict 
behaviors that are spontaneous (McClelland, Koestner & Weinberger, 1989). Thus, when 
presented with incentives or opportunities, the automaticity of implicit motives produces 
immediate and spontaneous behaviors.
Implicit motives are responsive to certain kinds of incentives. Incentives that elicit 
implicit motives tend to be naturally occurring in the environment. Implicit motives are 
responsive to the nature of experiencing an activity itself, not an external value placed 
upon the activity (McClelland, Koestner & Weinberger, 1989). Therefore, just as implicit 
motives develop from early affective experiences, implicit motives are responsive to the 
intrinsic affective components of specific activities, which then produce spontaneous
5behavior driven towards those incentives. For example, the implicit need for affiliation 
predicts the likelihood of being in a conversation with another person when assessed at 
random times during a given day (McClelland, Koestner & Weinberger, 1989).
Implicit motives, however automatic and stable, may not necessarily be well 
aligned with what one consciously desires. One may have desires to engage in behaviors 
that are important but not necessarily spontaneously initiated. These desires correspond to 
explicit motives.
In contrast to implicit motives, explicit motives (also called self-attributed 
motives) are conscious representations of the values that drive behavior (Thrash & Elliot, 
2002; Hofmann, Gschwendner & Schmitt, 2005; McClelland, Koestner & Weinberger, 
1989). Explicit motives are what one consciously acknowledges one is motivated to do, 
and as such are influenced by social norms and values. Thus, as opposed to implicit 
motives, explicit motives are developed based on social demands and normative 
pressures (Kehr, 2004). Thus, explicit motives are expressions of values that are 
influenced by social norms and demands, and because of this, explicit motives are often 
manifested as goals or duties (Kehr, 2004).
Because explicit motives are grounded in values, they are sensitive to social 
incentives that correspond with one’s values (Thrash & Elliot, 2002). Specifically, 
explicit motives are responsive to social incentives that involve rewards, prompts, 
expectations, or demands (McClelland, Koestner & Weinberger, 1989). Whereas the 
anticipation of pleasure or displeasure in an activity elicits implicit motives, the 
anticipation of a valued outcome of an activity elicits explicit motives. Explicit motive 
predict deliberate, respondent behaviors (Thrash & Elliot, 2002). In as much as an
6incentive is eliciting of one’s explicit motivation, one’s behavior will be in deliberate, 
conscious pursuit of that possible outcome. For example, those who report high self­
attributed need for affiliation are more likely to want a roommate than to live alone, and 
less likely to go to the movies alone (McClelland, Koestner & Weinberger, 1989). Thus, 
in line with one’s explicit expression of a need, one will engage in planned, deliberate 
behavior to satisfy that self-attributed need.
In sum, many implicit and explicit motives differ in some important ways.
Implicit motives are unconscious, develop from early affective experiences, and 
responsive to naturally occurring incentives of the pleasure or displeasure of an activity, 
and predictive of spontaneous behavior. Explicit motives are, on the other hand, 
conscious, develop from social norms, and responsive to incentives of valued outcomes, 
and predictive of deliberate behavior.
The differences between the two types of motives are also apparent in the way 
that they are measured. Measuring implicit constructs involves using projective measures 
to assess automatic responses to visual stimuli (Hofmann, Gschwendner & Schmitt,
2005). Implicit motives are typically measured using picture-story exercises (McClelland, 
Koestner & Weinberger, 1989). The participant is shown a series of pictures and given 
the freedom to create a set of stories based on the pictures. These stories are later coded 
for thematic content. It is postulated that given the unrestricted nature of a projective test, 
any thematic content found in an individual’s story is an indication of his or her natural 
inclinations and implicit motives. Explicit motives, on the other hand, are typically 
measured using self-report questionnaires (McClelland, Koestner & Weinberger, 1989). 
Self-report questionnaires indicate that the participant is aware of the implications of his
7or her answers, and thematic content is not coded as it is with projective measures, but 
readily apparent. McClelland, Koestner, and Weinberger (1989) reported that measures 
of implicit and explicit motives rarely correlate with each other.
Goals
Explicit motives share many of the same qualities with goals. Although goals are 
related to motives, goals constitute a distinct type of construct. Similar to motives, goals 
are representations of what an individual wants, desires, or is striving for in his or her 
current circumstances (Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Grassmann, 1998). A key difference 
between goals and motives is the temporal specificity of goals. Goals are what one 
desires or is striving for currently. This distinction highlights the consistent and stable 
nature of motives, and the more flexible nature of goals. This flexibility corresponds with 
the notion that goals are subject to one’s values as influenced by the social environment. 
Values themselves are flexible in that they may change due to changing social 
environments. Thus, goals spring in part from values, self-concept, and beliefs and are 
more consciously available than motives (insomuch as in the present research motives are 
conceptualized similar to implicit motives in previous research; Brunstein, Schultheiss, & 
Grassmann, 1998). Therefore, goals serve the function of setting personally relevant and 
important cognition-based objectives (Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Grassmann, 1998).
Goals guide an individual’s behaviors toward achieving personal objectives. This 
guidance aids in achieving the higher order objective of attaining meaning and purpose 
(Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999).
Goals are situation-specific cognitions that direct particular behaviors, whereas 
motives are more general orientations that broadly direct less specific behaviors. Thrash
8and Elliot (2001) described motives as providing energization toward behavior in a 
general direction, but cannot predict how a specific goal will be expressed. Motives can 
organize and guide behavior in a general way over time, but the goals that individuals 
endorse may not directly spring from these motives. Furthermore, motives may have little 
effect on how the goals are expressed and how desired outcomes are strategically 
approached (Brunstein, Schultheiss & Grassmann, 1998).
Congruence
Despite being distinct constructs, motives and goals conceptually overlap to a 
certain extent. Goals are conceptualized as the outward, tangible expression of motivation. 
This aspect of goals reveals the relatedness of the two concepts. Goals are therefore 
predicted by both underlying motives and by values. Underlying motives, however, do 
not predict goals as strongly as values do. Thus, goals can become disconnected from 
underlying motives for many individuals. Individuals can vary to the degree that their 
goals spring from their underlying motives. Some people may have goals that are in 
accordance with their motives, and some people may have goals that are disconnected 
from their motives. This lack of correspondence between motives and goals is termed 
incongruence. Alternatively, the correspondence between motives and goals is called 
congruence. Just as individuals differ in the types of motives and goals they endorse, 
individuals can also vary in the extent to which their motives and goals are congruent. 
Therefore, congruence itself is a variable that can be measured across individuals, and as 
such congruence can be used to predict outcomes. It is important to assess the predictive 
strength of motive-congruence.
Well-Being
9One of the most commonly predicted outcomes in personality is well-being. 
Subjective well-being is composed of three constructs -  positive affect, negative affect, 
and life satisfaction (Diener, Emmons, Larson, & Griffin, 1985). These constructs 
constitute how a person feels and how a person evaluates his or her life as a whole. 
Positive and negative affect are rooted in emotions, whereas life satisfaction is rooted in 
cognitive judgments concerning one’s progress in satisfying personal needs and goals 
(Diener, Emmons, Larson, & Griffin, 1985). These two components of well-being, affect 
and life-satisfaction, are conceptually related to motives and goals. Affect (how good or 
bad one feels) is defined as a valenced feeling state in response to emotionally salient 
events that are motivational in nature (Ekman & Davidson, 1994). Also, in concordance 
with the above definition of life satisfaction, the extent to which one is satisfied with 
one’s life is in part determined by how one interprets one’s success at personal goal 
strivings. Therefore, well-being is not only an important construct to predict, but also 
conceptually relates to motive-goal congruence.
Research has shown specifically how well-being and congruence are related.
Hofer and Chasiotis (2003) reported that for the achievement and affiliation motive 
domains, the congruence of implicit motives and self-attributed goals positively predicted 
life satisfaction. Furthermore, research has revealed that implicit motives moderate how 
strongly goal commitment and attainability predict well-being. High commitment to a 
motive-congruent goal is a positive predictor of well-being, and high commitment to a 
motive-incongruent goal is a negative predictor of well-being (Brunstein, Schultheiss, & 
Grassmann, 1998). Also, progress toward motive-congruent goals positively predicts
10
well-being (Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Grassmann, 1998). Therefore, motive-goal 
congruence has been shown to be a significant positive predictor of well-being.
Additionally, Sheldon and Elliot (1999) explored the discrepancies between 
motives and goals in their self-concordant model. It was shown that goals that are more 
concordant with one’s “self’ yield increased sustained goal effort, which in turn yields 
increased goal attainability and finally increased need satisfaction and well-being 
(Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Similarly, one would expect that if goals are more congruent 
with motives, then goal effort, goal success, and well-being will increase. Predicting later 
well-being controlling for initial well-being begins to address whether this is any causal 
direction of prediction between motive-goal congruence and well-being. This connection 
between motive-goal congruence and well-being leads to the first hypothesis of this 
research. It is proposed that motive-goal congruence will predict change in well-being 
over time controlling for initial well-being.
Ipsative Congruence
The second hypothesis concerns a new type of congruence that has yet to be 
examined. Previous research has treated congruence as a normative variable. Block (1957) 
explained that a normative measurement is one in which each score for an individual is 
compared to the mean score of a group. Until now, all of the congruence literature has 
assessed congruence by evaluating an individual’s motive and goal standings relative to 
others’ motive and goal standings. From this perspective, one is normatively congruent if 
one’s motive and goal are matched relative to the group (see Figures la  and lb). 
Specifically, one is normatively congruent if one has a high motive and high goal, low 
motive and low goal, or moderate motive and moderate goal. One is normatively
11
incongruent if one’s motive and goal are not matched relative to the group (see Figures 
lc and Id). Specifically normative incongruence is present if one had a high motive and 
low goal, low motive and high goal, moderate motive and high goal, or any other 
permutation. This relative standing of motives and goals constitutes normative 
congruence.
Normative congruence in this study is assessed in the same manner as previous 
research with the exception that most congruence research uses one time point, not the 
mean derived from multiple time points as used in this research. Thus, instead of a single 
score for each motive and goal, a mean score of each motive and goal is taken across the 
five time points. Using mean motives and mean goals simply increases the reliability of 
these variables.
The use of multiple time points provides the opportunity to asses the degree to 
which motives and goals vary together for a given individual. Block (1957) defined 
ipsative measurement as one in which a set of scores is evaluated relative to an 
individual’s personal mean. Therefore in this study, how motives and goals vary together 
across time constitutes ipsative congruence. From this perspective one is ipsatively 
congruent if one’s motives and goals vary together across time (see Figures lb  and Id). 
One is ipsatively incongruent if one’s motives and goals do not covary or, worse, if they 
vary inversely across time (see Figures la  and lc).
Standardized congruence scores for an individual yield information on where a 
particular person falls in a distribution of congruence scores in relation to other 
individuals in the sample. This is true of both normative congruence and ipsative 
congruence variables. Thus, individuals can be compared to the group as to how
12
normatively congruent or how ipsatively congruent they are. The fact that motive-goal 
congruence can be assessed in two conceptually different ways raises questions about the 
predictive strength of the two types of congruence. Can ipsative congruence account for 
variance in well-being above and beyond normative congruence? Congruence is a 
personal experience. It springs from an individual’s internal motives and what that 
individual has come to value from external cues. As such, a score representing the 
relative standing o f an individual’s motives and goals may be less informative of that 
person’s well-being than a score representing how much an individual’s motives and 
goals vary together across time. The second hypothesis is that ipsative congruence will 
account for change in well-being above and beyond normative congruence.
Mindfulness
If motive-goal congruence predicts well-being, then it is important to assess who 
is higher in motive-goal congruence. There could be personality factors such as self- 
awareness, reflection, or mindfulness that moderate the degree of correspondence 
between implicit and explicit constructs (Hofmann, Bawronski, Gschwendner, Le & 
Schmitt, 2005). Thrash and Elliot (2002) found that self-determination predicted higher 
congruence between implicit and explicit achievement-approach motives. Private body 
consciousness and preference for consistency have also been found to predict 
achievement-approach congruence (Thrash, Elliot, Schultheiss, & Murray, 2006). 
Therefore, individuals with these traits are more likely to be congruent, and by extension, 
individual differences in congruence can be predicted by certain trait variables. Individual 
differences in these personality factors help to explain the previous lack of significant 
correlations between motives and goals if there were personality factors that were not
13
considered. Therefore, the relationship between motives and goals could be moderated by 
personality variables that reflect the extent to which people are in tune with what is 
happening inside them.
In the present study it is proposed that one variable that also relates to motive-goal 
congruence is that of mindfulness. Mindfulness is defined as the process in which one is 
consciously attentive to and aware of one’s moment-to-moment experience (Bishop et al., 
2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). The 
mindfulness construct may relate to motive-goal congruence in that by definition 
mindfulness includes components of internal and external experience. Brown and Ryan 
(2003) described awareness as a “radar” of consciousness. Awareness functions as the 
constant monitor of inner and outer experience. Attention is the means by which 
consciousness is focused, yielding an increase in sensitivity to subtle differences in 
experience (Brown & Ryan, 2003). This attention to and awareness of one’s present 
experience specifically involves an open frame of mind through which one observes 
one’s experience (Brown & Ryan, 2003).
Open observation is essential to the construct of mindfulness and is implicit in the 
components and mechanisms that contribute to mindfulness. The components of 
mindfulness, according to Shapiro et al. (2006), include intention, attention, and attitude. 
Intention is what drives one toward becoming mindful; attention is the active observation 
of one’s internal and external experience and the ability to focus while simultaneously 
inhibiting secondary elaborative and judgmental processes; and attitude is the curious and 
non-judgmental frame of mind with which one engages in mindfulness (Shapiro et al.,
2006). Intention, attention, and attitude combine to assist mindful individuals in
14
recognizing different internal and external processes at work. Internal processes 
constitute natural inclinations and feelings, and external processes constitute the outside 
forces influencing one’s thoughts and behaviors. One may attempt to actively gain more 
knowledge about those processes without assigning values or judgments to the processes. 
Thus mindfulness is a means by which to gain knowledge and a greater understanding of 
the forces (internal and external) that drive one. This gained knowledge can be employed 
in a way that can bring internal and external drives closer together. Therefore, if mindful, 
one may have the opportunity to bring one’s goals into better alignment with one’s 
motives.
Langer and Moldoveanu (2000) argued that when mindful, the entire individual is 
involved; which highlights that the individual integrates what is internal and external to 
that person. Mindfulness permits increased access to what is unconscious. By attending to 
subtle changes in internal experiences, individuals may gain access to what would 
otherwise be inaccessible. Bishop et al. (2004) explained that this increased access to 
private experiences can facilitate more personally effective behavior. Greater access to 
internal information helps individuals to make behavioral choices that are more 
concordant with what is internal. It is generally assumed that when alignment increases it 
is due to the external moving towards the internal as opposed to the internal moving 
toward the external. This assumption may spring from how internal and external 
processes are conceptualized. Internal processes, occurring at an unconscious level, are 
not only difficult to access but also difficult to adjust. External processes, occurring at a 
conscious level, appear to be less difficult to access and also less difficult to adjust. Thus 
it follows that if one is mindful, then external processes may become more concordant
15
with internal processes. Within the field motivation, this function of mindfulness 
translates to an individual’s goals becoming more congruent with the individual’s 
motives.
Brown and Ryan (2003) provided evidence for a connection between mindfulness 
and a different kind congruence than addressed in the present research. More mindful 
participants displayed more congruence between implicit affect and explicit affect than 
less mindful participants. This increase in affective congruence suggests that more 
mindful people may be more in touch with their implicit emotions, and being more in 
touch with implicit emotions may become reflected in their explicit reports (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003). Bishop (2004) proposed that mindfulness may yield an increased ability to 
see the connection among thoughts, feelings, and actions. Recognizing these connections 
may illuminate the causes of one’s behavior. To extend the research connecting 
mindfulness with implicit and explicit congruence, motive-goal congruence is assessed in 
the present study, as opposed to affective congruence. Similar results can be expected for 
this research on motive-goal congruence given the close relationship between affect and 
motivation. Mindfulness may assist in increasing motive-goal congruence in part because 
of increased access to implicit emotional reactions to motivationally salient events and 
cues.
Therefore, in the third hypothesis the research question shifts from whether 
congruence is a “good” thing to who is higher in congruence. In this third hypothesis it is 
postulated that the interaction of mindfulness and motives will predict change in goal 
importance. Among people who are mindful, goals are expected to change to become 
more similar to one’s motive, thereby increasing motive-goal congruence across time.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 107 undergraduates (49 males and 58 females) attending the College of 
Williams and Mary participated in the study. Participants had a mean age of M =  18.49 
(SD = 0.82). Eleven were African American, two were Asian, eighty-one were Caucasian, 
seven were Hispanic, and six identified themselves as other. Participants completed the 
study in return for full credit toward their introductory psychology course.
Materials
Motives. Motives were assessed using the Multi Motive Grid (MMG; Schmalt, 
Langens, & Puca, 2000) a semi-projective questionnaire (see Appendix A). The MMG is 
comprised of 14 ambiguous pictures, each followed by a series of statements representing 
six motivation domains: hope of success (HS), fear of failure (FF), hope of affiliation 
(HA), fear of rejection (FR), hope of power (HP), and fear of loss of power (FP).
Examples of these statements include: “Feeling confident to succeed at this task” (HS), 
“Thinking about lacking ability at this task” (FF), “Feeling good about meeting other 
people” (HA), “Being afraid of being rejected by others” (FR), “Trying to influence other 
people” (HP), and “Anticipating to loose standing” (FP). Research shows good reliability 
for the MMG with alpha coefficients ranging from .78 to .90 (Sokolowski et al., 2000). 
The yes-no format of the original MMG was changed to a 7-point Likert scale, with a 
midpoint label of “neutral” and yes-no anchors. The Likert scale was used in an effort to 
increase the variance across time within persons.
16
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Personal Goals. To assess various goal dimensions, a Personal Goals Inventory was 
created (see Appendix B). The Personal Goals Inventory is an idiographic measure in 
which participants supply their own personal goals. These goals include two goals each 
for achievement approach, achievement avoidance, affiliating approach, affiliation 
avoidance, power approach, and power avoidance. Participants received instructions as to 
how to complete this Personal Goal Inventory (see Appendix C). Each participant then 
completed ratings on each of the 12 personal goals he or she supplied. Participants rated 
each goal on nine dimensions, three of which are used in the present investigation: 
importance of the goal (“How important is each goal to you at present?”), overall 
investment in the goal (“How much of your attention, time, and energy do you intend to 
invest in each goal during the next week?”), intended effort (“How much effort do you 
intend to put forth toward each goal during the next week?”; see Appendix D). A 
composite goal variable was created from the three goal variables importance, investment, 
and effort. This composite variable will hereafter be referred to as “goal importance.” Six 
goal importance variables were created, two for each goal type (achievement, affiliation, 
and power) and within each goal type, one for each goal valence (approach and 
avoidance).
Congruence. Two types of congruence were examined, normative and ipsative.
For each type, congruence was computed two separate ways. For the first method of 
assessment of normative congruence, an interaction term was created by multiplying the 
standardized score of the mean motive across the five time points by the standardized 
score of the mean goal across the five time points. A separate interaction term was 
created for each of the six domains of motives and goals (i.e., one for HS and
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achievement-approach goals, one for FF and achievement-avoidance goals, one for HA 
and affiliation-approach goals, one for FR and affiliation-avoidance goals, one for HP 
and power-approach goals, and one for FP and power-avoidance goals). For the second 
assessment, normative congruence was computed using difference scores. As with the 
former computation of normative congruence, difference scores were created for each of 
the six motive-goal types. Difference scores were created for the normative version of 
congruence by talcing the average of all five time points for each particular motive and 
goal variable. These averages were standardized with respect to the population. Then 
congruence was calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference of the motive 
and goal standardized scores.
For the first method of assessment of ipsative congruence, the correlation between 
motives and goals across five time points was computed separately for each participant. 
This variable was computed for each of the six types of motives and goals. For the 
second method of assessment, ipsative congruence was assessed using difference scores. 
Difference scores were created as an index of ipsative congruence by creating 
standardized motive and goal variables for each participant separately. Each participant 
had five time points for a given variable (e.g. achievement-approach motive, affiliation- 
avoidance goal, etc.). For each participant, five standardized scores were computed using 
the five time points corresponding only to that individual. Then congruence at each time 
point was computed by taking the difference between the motive standardized score and 
the goal standardized score. Each of these congruence scores for each time point was 
averaged together to create an overall ipsative difference score. This difference score was 
calculated for each of the six types of motives and goals. Difference scores are
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technically measurements of incongruence. To eliminate confusion in the results, 
difference score variables were reversed scored to show that higher scores indicate 
greater congruence.
Well-being. Well-being was assessed using the Satisfaction With Life Scale 
(SWLS). The SWLS includes items such as “In most ways my life is close to ideal,” “I 
am satisfied with my life,” and “I have gotten the important things I want in life” (Diener, 
Emmons, Larson, & Griffin, 1985; See Appendix E). The reliability of the SWLS for 
each time point was good with alpha coefficients ranging from .83 to .92, and the overall 
reliability of the SWLS across all time points was also good with an alpha coefficient 
of .96.
Mindfulness. Mindfulness was measure using the Mindfulness Attention 
Awareness Scale (MAAS). The MAAS uses items such as “I could be experiencing some 
emotion and not be conscious of it until some time later”, “I break or spill things because 
of carelessness, not paying attention, or thinking of something else”, and “I tend not to 
notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they really grab my attention” 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003; see Appendix F). These items are phrased in a manner that 
denotes mindlessness. The scale for the MAAS ranges from 1 (“Almost Always”) to 6 
(“Almost Never”). Therefore, higher one scores on this measure indicate the less 
mindlessness and greater mindfulness. The reliability for the MAAS was good with an 
alpha coefficient of .76.
Procedure
Participants attended five sessions, each one week apart. There were six possible 
sections for which participants could sign up: an 8 o’clock session and a 9 o’clock
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session on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday evenings. If a participant missed a session, 
it was made up during a subsequent session, or individually on Friday, Saturday, or 
Sunday. Research has shown that there is consistency in the occurrence of positive and 
negative affect across the weekdays (Thrash, in press). There is some evidence of 
increased positive affect and decreased negative affect on Fridays and Saturdays (Thrash, 
in press). This possible confound was lessened in that weekend make-up sessions were 
minimized by reminder emails. Only 12 participants made up a session on Friday, 
Saturday, or Sunday. Each session began with an instructional announcement from the 
study proctor (see Appendix G).
During the first session, participants received and signed the Informed Consent 
Form (see Appendix H) and then received packets including a blank Personal Goal 
Inventory and the questionnaire packet. Participants began the questionnaire packet by 
completing the MMG. Participants then completed several short questionnaires not used 
in this study, and then continued on to the personal goal section. Participants read 
directions for filling in their personal goals on the Goal Sheet. Once participants 
completed writing their goals, they rated each of their goals on nine variables. Following 
the goal ratings, participants completed measures of life satisfaction and other variables 
regarding the current day. Finally, participants filled out demographic measures. The 
sequence of measures was created for the purpose of limiting the influence the Personal 
Goal Inventory measure might have on the MMG. The MMG was given first so that 
scores from this projective measure would not be influenced by an awareness of one’s 
goals. Similarly, the goal production and goal ratings were separated in proximity from 
the MMG so as to detract from the potential relatedness of the two measures.
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The subsequent sessions proceeded in the same manner. Participants arrived, were 
read oral instructions, and received their individual packets containing their previously 
completed Goal Sheets and a new questionnaire packet, which was the same as the first 
except for the addition of different trait measures at each time point. Mindfulness was 
assessed during the fourth session. Additional trait variables were collected but are not 
used in the present study. At the end of the fifth session, participants responded to a 
Follow-up Question (see Appendix I) asking what they felt what was meant to be 
measured with the MMG. Thereafter, participants received a Debriefing form (see 
Appendix J) describing the purpose of the study.
RESULTS
Congruence and Well-being
Normative Congruence (NC). See Table 1 for descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in the following analyses. To test the hypothesis that congruence between 
motives and goals predicts change in life-satisfaction, a regression was performed 
predicting Time 5 life-satisfaction from goal importance, the motive, and the interaction 
of the two (NC), controlling for Time 1 life-satisfaction. This analysis was repeated six 
times, one regression for each combination of motive type (achievement, affiliation, and 
power) and valence (approach and avoidance). The interaction between HS motive and 
achievement-approach goal importance significantly predicted Time 5 life-satisfaction, /? 
= .23 p  < .01 (see Table 2 and Figure 2a). The interaction between FF motive and 
achievement-avoidance goal importance significantly predicted Time 5 life- 
satisfaction, p  = .17,/? < .05 (see Table 3 and Figure 2b). The remaining four 
regression analyses did not yield any significant interaction te/?//cr.
NC was also analyzed using the difference score approach. For each motive 
domain a regression was performed predicting Time 5 life-satisfaction from NC 
difference score, IC difference score, and Time 1 life-satisfaction. The normative 
difference score of HS motive and achievement-approach goal importance significantly 
predicted Time 5 life-satisfaction with p=  .18, p < .05 (see Table 4). All other NC 
difference scores where nonsignificant predictors of Time 5 life-satisfaction.
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Ipsative Congruence (IC). To test whether ipsative congruence accounts for 
additional variance in Time 5 life-satisfaction above and beyond normative congruence, 
using the first method of assessment, the correlation of the motive and goal importance 
(IC) was added as a predictor to each of the first set of NC regressions. For each of the 
six motive domains a regression was performed predicting Time 5 life-satisfaction from 
goal importance, the motive, and the interaction of the two (NC), the correlation of the 
motive and goal importance (IC), Time 1 life-satisfaction, the standard deviation of the 
motive, and the standard deviation of the goal. The standard deviations of motives and 
goals were controlled because the correlation coefficient is confounded with the standard 
deviations of the two correlated variables. IC of FP motive and the power-avoidance 
goal importance negatively predict Time 5 life-satisfaction, /? = -.21, p  < .01 (see Table 
5). The remaining five regression analyses did not yield any significant results for the 
correlation term.
For the second method of assessment, IC was also analyzed using the difference 
score approach. For each motive domain a regression was performed predicting Time 5 
life-satisfaction from NC difference score, IC difference score, and Time 1 life- 
satisfaction The IC difference score of fear of FP motive and power-avoidance goal 
importance negatively predicted Time 5 life-satisfaction, f  = -.18,p < .05 (see Table 6). 
All other IC difference scores where nonsignificant predictors of Time 5 life-satisfaction. 
Congruence and Mindfulness
To test the hypothesis that mindfulness may increase congruence, regressions 
were run for each of the six motive domains. In each regression, a motive, mindfulness, 
the interaction of the two, and Time 1 goal importance were used to predict Time 5 goal
importance. The interaction of the HS motive and mindfulness significantly predicted 
change in achievement-approach goal importance, j3 = .20,p  < .05 (see Table 7 and 
Figure 3 a). The interaction of the HP motive and mindfulness significantly predicted 
change in power-approach goal importance, /? = .18, p  < .05 (see Table 8 and Figure 3b). 
All other results for the motive by mindfulness interaction were nonsignificant.
DISCUSSION
Three hypotheses were tested in this study. The first hypothesis was put forth to 
replicate the relationship between motive-goal congruence and well-being that has been 
documented in previous research. The results showed that for the achievement-approach 
domain congruence positively predicted change in life-satisfaction. This finding was 
consistent across both methods of assessment of normative congruence. Similar results 
were found for the achievement-avoidance domain using the interaction method, where 
fear of failure motive and avoidant achievement goal congruence positively predicted 
change in life-satisfaction. These findings confirm the predictive relationship previous 
literature has found between motive-goal congruence and well-being. Essentially, having 
goals that are in line with what one is spontaneously motivated to do facilitates 
satisfaction with one’s life. Being spontaneously driven to accomplish what one values 
makes the pursuit of such goals more enjoyable and less taxing. This holds true for the 
achievement domain regardless of whether the motive and goal have an approach or an 
avoidance valence. Despite research documenting that avoidance oriented individuals 
experience less well-being than approach oriented individuals, having goals that are 
congruent with one’s motives still predicts higher well-being. Therefore, although 
avoidance oriented individuals tend to experience less well-being, having goals 
appropriately aligned with achievement-avoidance motives is nonetheless beneficial. 
Setting goals that are misaligned with one’s motives my produce more difficulty in
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achieving those goals than if the goals were aligned with one’s motives, which could 
contribute to a lack of well-being.
No significant results were found for normative congruence for the affiliation or 
power motive domains with either approach or avoidance valence. It is unclear why this 
pattern of results emerged for the achievement domain and not for the affiliation and 
power domains. One reason for this pattern of results may be that given that the sample 
was comprised of college students, these participants may generally derive greater 
satisfaction from achievement oriented pursuits than from affiliation and power oriented 
pursuits.
The fact that both methods of assessment (congruence as an interaction of motives 
and goals, and congruence as a difference score) produced similar results makes these 
findings more robust. However, the hypothesis was confirmed more often and more 
strongly for the interaction method than the difference score method. This indicates that 
the interaction method of assessment may be more sensitive to congruence than the 
difference score method. Difference score assessments have some methodological 
problems. Edwards (1994) stated that difference scores are not mathematically equal to 
the two components that comprise the difference score, and that difference scores are 
directionless in that they represents a discrepancy between two components but not how 
the two scores are discrepant. A difference score for a given motive and goal does not 
yield information on whether the motive is high and the goal is low for example. 
Therefore, the interaction method of assessment proves to be a more robust way to 
measure congruence, and the difference score assessment simply functions to further 
support the results found with the interaction method.
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The second hypothesis was put forth in order to assess motive-goal congruence 
from a different conceptual standpoint. Previous literature has documented a positive 
relationship between congruence and well-being but has only examined congruence at a 
normative level of analysis. Congruence can be assessed as ipsative congruence which is 
based on whether motives and goals vary together across time. This establishes the 
individual as the basis of comparison. Congruence is a personal phenomenon, involving 
the internal and external demands of an individual. Therefore, it follows that information 
on ipsative congruence should contribute to additional explained variance above and 
beyond normative congruence when predicting well-being. The results did not support 
this hypothesis. Ipsative congruence provided no additional significant prediction for the 
approach valence. Furthermore, for the power-avoidance domain congruence negatively 
predicted change in life-satisfaction. Therefore, given the ipsative congruence assessment, 
when one’s FP motive is aligned with how much importance, investment and effort one 
gives to one’s power-avoidant goals, life-satisfaction decreases over time. It is unclear 
why this pattern o f power-avoidance congruence, as assessed as an ipsative variable, 
would negatively predict well-being. Perhaps goals that focus on avoidance of the loss of 
power are ill defined and hard to execute generally or for a college population. 
Furthermore, due to the number or regression analyses performed it is possible that this 
unexpected finding is due to chance.
The third hypothesis was put forth to evaluate how the interaction between 
mindfulness and motives could predict changes in one’s goals. The results showed that 
the interaction between mindfulness and the hope for success motive predicted the 
change in the achievement-approach goal. This result indicates that individuals higher in
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mindfulness change their goals in the direction of greater motive-goal congruence. 
Mindfulness constitutes awareness and attention to internal and external experience. It 
follows that those who are more mindful may have more information about what their 
motives are, due to this increased awareness and attention. The increased information that 
mindfulness provides may allow mindful individuals to evaluate their goals and 
accordingly give more importance to, investment in, and effort towards goals that 
correspond with their motives.
The primary limitation of this study is the number of time points. The sample was 
drawn from a pool of introductory psychology students; these students receive research 
credit in exchange for participation. This credit is applied to the grade they receive for the 
semester. The parameters of the research pool constrained the study in that the students 
had three hours of research participation to fill. Given the timing of each session, these 
three hours could only be distributed across five time points. Due to the limited number 
of time points it was harder to determine systematic variance for the ipsative congruence 
components.
Also, the use of the MMG may be considered a limitation for this study. Each 
experimental session was one week apart, and once each session was underway, the 
questionnaires began with the MMG. Although the order o f pictures in the MMG was 
randomly varied at each time, some participants may have approached the questionnaire 
consistently differently from other participants. Some participants may have recognized 
the pictures and questions and responded in the same manner at each time point out of 
habit, as opposed to responding genuinely at each time point. On the other hand, some 
participants may have tried to make a conscious effort to vary their answers, which again
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calls into question how genuine participants’ responses were. Additionally, the 
reliabilities for motives at time one were less than desirable. The reliabilities for the 
subsequent times were all acceptable. This reliability issue indicates that other projective 
tests may be better measures of motives than the MMG.
These limitations should be addressed in future research. Given that ipsative 
congruence may not have been accurately assessed with only five time points, using 10 to 
15 time points may yield a more accurate assessment of ipsative congruence. This could 
be accomplished by using shortened measures of motives and goals in conjunction with a 
daily diary assessment method. Therefore, using more time points will help to better gain 
more information about and better operationalize ipsative congruence in future research. 
Furthermore, given less time constraints it would be beneficial to employ the Thematic 
Apperception Test (TAT). Using the TAT may help reduce some of the error variance 
that may have been caused by using the MMG. The MMG is a relatively new measure of 
motives, and lacks the extensive research establishing and replicating the reliability and 
validity that is available in support for the TAT.
Finally, further research is also needed to explore the behavioral implications of 
the connection between mindfulness and motive-goal congruence. Given that motives are 
associated with automatic engagement and goals are associated with planned behavior, it 
follows that, when mindful, the increased congruence between motives and goals would 
yield greater consistency between automatic behaviors and one’s planned behaviors. 
Behavior may change in two possible ways when mindful individuals increase in motive- 
goal congruence. One possibility is that goal-oriented behavior may become more 
spontaneous and automatic like the behaviors associated with motives. Mindfulness,
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however, emphasizes active observation which should produce the deautomization of 
automatic or mindless behaviors. Therefore, the second possibility is that conscious 
attention and awareness of motives may produce more deliberate, planned behavior.
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Time Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Internal
Consistency
Mindfulness - 3.69 0.61 2.33 4.87 .76
HS
1 4.37 0.68 2.55 6.09 .54
2 4.35 0.77 2.18 6.55 .68
3 4.37 0.84 1.55 7.00 .77
4 4.38 0.91 1.00 6.55 .80
5 4.37 0.81 2.27 6.36 .75
HA
1 4.08 0.76 2.00 6.00 .61
2 4.04 0.86 1.92 5.83 .76
3 4.04 1.00 1.08 7.00 .83
4 4.01 0.94 1.00 6.18 .80
5 4.01 0.91 1.25 6.33 .80
HP
1 4.62 0.81 2.25 6.08 .67
2 4.75 0.97 1.83 6.83 .81
3 4.64 1.03 1.92 7.00 .84
4 4.69 0.99 1.25 7.00 .83
5 4.82 0.96 1.92 7.00 .81
FF
1 3.86 0.91 1.25 5.83 .69
2 4.03 0.99 1.67 6.08 .78
3 4.03 1.09 1.00 6.42 .83
4 4.20 1.03 1.50 7.00 .81
5 4.10 1.07 1.00 6.18 .84
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED
Variable Time Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Internal
Consistency
FR
1 3.58 1.00 1.33 6.00 .79
2 3.69 1.06 1.25 6.00 0^
oo
3 3.59 1.16 1.00 6.42 .89
4 3.81 1.19 1.09 6.73 .89
5 3.63 1.21 1.00 6.42 .90
FP
1 3.83 0.94 1.33 6.08 .69
2 3.99 1.09 1.08 6.50 .83
3 3.82 1.15 1.00 7.00 .85
4 3.92 1.15 1.00 6.50 .87
Ach-Ap
Goal
5 3.83 1.19 1.00 6.25 .87
1 5.59 1.06 2.83 7.00 .87
2 5.44 1.19 2.17 7.00 .88
3 5.20 1.38 1.50 7.00 .91
4 5.30 1.43 1.00 7.00 .94
Aff-Ap
Goal
5 5.18 1.50 1.00 7.00 ,94
1 5.14 1.21 1.33 7.00 .85
2 4.81 1.35 1.00 7.00 .87
3 4.78 1.38 1.67 7.00 .88
4 4.72 1.45 1.00 7.00 .91
5 4.77 1.39 1.00 7.00 .90
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED
Variable Time Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Internal
Consistency
Pow-Ap
Goal
1 4.51 1.18 1.67 7.00 .80
2 4.06 1.40 1.00 6.83 .85
3 3.79 1.52 1.00 7.00 .90
4 3.82 1.53 1.00 7.00 .88
Ach-Av
Goal
5 3.72 1.54 1.00 7.00 .88
1 5.14 1.21 1.83 7.00 .87
2 4.93 1.32 1.17 7.00 .84
3 4.67 1.54 1.00 7.00 .94
4 4.68 1.50 1.00 7.00 .92
Aff-Av
Goal
5 4.63 1.56 1.00 7.00 .92
1 4.43 1.14 1.67 6.67 .79
2 4.01 1.29 1.00 6.67 .84
3 3.90 1.48 1.00 7.00 .89
4 3.82 1.44 1.00 7.00 .89
Pow-Av
Goal
5 3.87 1.48 1.00 7.00 .90
1 4.72 1.36 1.17 7.00 .83
2 4.16 1.48 1.00 7.00 .84
3 3.95 1.65 1.00 7.00 .90
4 3.86 1.75 1.00 7.00 .91
5 3.97 1.69 1.00 7.00 .90
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TABLE 1 CONTINUED
Variable Time Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Internal
Consistency
Life-
Satisfaction
1 4.37 1.31 1.00 7.00 .83
2 4.45 1.38 1.00 7.00 .88
3 4.55 1.36 1.00 7.00 .88
4 4.47 1.43 1.00 7.00 .92
5 4.57 1.38 1.00 7.00 .90
Note. N =  107 
HS = Hope for Success 
HA = Hope for Affiliation 
HP = Hope for Power 
FF = Fear of Failure 
FR = Fear of Rejection 
FP = Fear of Loss of Power 
Ach-Ap = Achievement-Approach 
Aff-Ap = Affiliation-Approach 
Pow-Ap = Power-Approach 
Ach-Av = Achievement-Avoidance 
Aff-Av = Affiliation-Avoidance 
Pow-Av — Power Avoidance
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TABLE 2
REGRESSION PREDICTING TIME 5 LIFE-SATISFACTION FROM 
ACHIEVEMENT-APPROACH VARIABLES
Variable B SEB P
HS Motive 0.80 0.50 0.12
Achievement-approach Goal 0.38 0.50 0.05
NC Interaction 1.43 0.44 0.23**
Time 1 Life-satisfaction 0.65 0.08 0.61**
* * p  < .01.
Notes. HS = Hope for Success 
NC = Normative Congruence
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TABLE 3
REGRESSION PREDICTING TIME 5 LIFE-SATISFACTION FROM 
ACHIEVEMENT-AVOIDANCE VARIABLES
Variable B SEB P
FF Motive -0.03 0.53 0.00
Achievement-avoidance Goal 0.94 0.52 0.13
NC Interaction 1.12 0.51 0.17*
Time 1 Life-satisfaction 0.65 0.08 0.61**
* p  < .05. **p  < .01.
Notes. FF = Fear of Failure 
NC = Normative Congruence
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TABLE 4
REGRESSION PREDICTING TIME 5 LIFE-SATISFACTION FROM
DIFFERENCE
SCORES BETWEEN HS MOTIVE AND ACHIEVEMENT-APPROACH GOAL
Variables B SEB P
NC Difference 1.18 0.50 0.18*
IC Difference 0.33 0.52 0.05
Time 1 Life-satisfaction 0.66 0.08 0.63**
* p  < .05. ** p  < .01.
Notes. NC = Normative Congruence 
IC = Ipsative Congruence
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TABLE 5
REGRESSION PREDICTING TIME 5 LIFE-SATISFACTION FROM POWER-
AVOIDANCE VARIABLES
Variables B SEB P
FP Motive -0.34 0.51 -0.05
Power-avoidance Goal 1.69 0.50 0.24**
NC Interaction 0.52 0.46 0.08
IC Correlation -2.78 0.96 -0.21**
Time 1 Life-satisfaction 0.70 0.08 0.66**
SD FP Motive 0.03 0.14 0.02
SD Power-avoidance Goal -0.32 0.52 -0.05
* * / >  <  .01.
Notes. FP = Fear of Loss of Power 
NC = Normative Congruence 
IC = Ipsative Congruence 
SD = Standard Deviation
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TABLE 6
REGRESSION PREDICTING TIME 5 LIFE-SATISFACTION FROM
DIFFERENCE
SCORES BETWEEN FP MOTIVE AND POWER-AVOIDANCE GOAL
Variables B SEB P
NC Difference 0.32 0.55 0.04
IC Difference -0.76 0.31 -0.18*
Time 1 Life-satisfaction 0.71 0.08 0.66**
* p  < .05. ** p  < .01.
Notes. NC = Normative Congruence 
IC = Ipsative Congruence
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TABLE 7
REGRESSION PREDICTING TIME 5 ACHIEVEMENT-APPROACH GOAL
FROM
HS MOTIVE AND MINDFULNESS
Variables B SEB P
Achievement-approach Goal Time 1 0.65 0.12 0.46**
HS Motive 0.26 0.25 0.09
Mindfulness -0.25 0.25 -0.08
Motive X Mindfulness 0.55 0.24 0.20*
*p  < .05. ** p  < .01.
Note. HS = Hope for Success
41
TABLE 8
REGRESSION PREDICTING TIME 5 POWER-APPROACH GOAL FROM HP
MOTIVE AND MINDFULNESS
Variables B SEB P
Power-approach Goal Time 1 0.67 0.11 0.51**
HP Motive -0.12 0.27 -0.04
Mindfulness 0.05 0.27 0.02
Motive X Mindfulness 0.51 0.25 0.18*
* p  < .05. ** p  < .01.
Note. HP = Hope for Power
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FIGURE 1
GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF CONGRUENCE
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FIGURE 2
NORMATIVE CONGRUENCE INTERACTIONS
2A. Hope for Success Motive by Achievement-Approach Interaction
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FIGURE 3
MINDFULNESS AND MOTIVE INTERACTIONS
3A. Mindfulness by Hope for Success Motive Interaction
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APPENDIX A 
MULTI MOTIVE GRID 
Instructions
People deal with different and changing situations every day. The change of a 
situation is always accompanied by a change of thoughts and feelings. 
People differ in the way they experience different situations. We are 
interested in these differences and you can help us to learn more about them.
On the following pages, you will see a set of pictures depicting all kinds of 
everyday situations. We did not choose very clear and detailed pictures 
because we want you to use your imagination in guessing what might be 
going on in these pictures. Please try to put yourself in the position of one of 
the persons who are shown in these pictures.
Below these pictures, you will also find a set of statements describing the way 
people could think and feel in this situation. Please decide for each statement 
whether it describes this situation. If it does, check “YES“, if it does not, check 
“NO“. Please do not think about a single statement too long and try to follow 
your spontaneous impression.
Please turn to the next page when you have finished working on the 
statements of the first page. Answer the following situations in the same 
manner until you have finished all pages.
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No Neutral
Feeling good about meeting other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Anticipating to lose standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being overpowered by other 
people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to get in touch with other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to acquire a good standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Yes
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No Neutral Yes
Anticipating to lose standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling confident to succeed at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being rejected by others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being overpowered by other 
people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being boring to others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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No Neutral Yes
Feeling good about meeting other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Anticipating to lose standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being overpowered by other 
people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to get in touch with other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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No Neutral
Feeling confident to succeed at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being rejected by others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling good about one’s competency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being boring to others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to acquire a good standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Yes
50
No Neutral Yes
Feeling good about meeting other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Anticipating to lose standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being rejected by others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being overpowered by other 
people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to get in touch with other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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No Neutral Yes
Feeling confident to succeed at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being rejected by others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling good about one’s competency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being boring to others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trying to influence other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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No Neutral Yes
Anticipating to lose standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling confident to succeed at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trying to influence other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to get in touch with other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to acquire a good standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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No Neutral Yes
Feeling good about meeting other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Anticipating to lose standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling confident to succeed at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being rejected by others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being overpowered by other 
people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling good about one’s competency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being boring to others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trying to influence other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to get in touch with other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to acquire a good standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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No
Anticipating to lose standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being overpowered by other 
people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trying to influence other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
eutral Yes
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No Neutral Yes
Feeling good about meeting other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling confident to succeed at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being rejected by others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling good about one’s competency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being boring to others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trying to influence other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to acquire a good standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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No
Feeling good about meeting other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling confident to succeed at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling good about one's competency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trying to influence other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to get in touch with other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to acquire a good standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
eutral Yes
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No Neutral Yes
Feeling confident to succeed at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling good about one’s competency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wanting to postpone a difficult task for a while 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trying to influence other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to get in touch with other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to acquire a good standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Fl
No Neutral
Feeling good about meeting other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being overpowered by other 
people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trying to influence other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to get in touch with other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to acquire a good standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Yes
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No Neutral Yes
Anticipating losing standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being rejected by others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being overpowered by other 
people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Feeling good about one’s competency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Being afraid of being boring to others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hoping to get in touch with other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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APPENDIX B
PERSONAL GOAL INVENTORY
Listing of personal goals
Please do not complete this page until you are directed to do so in the questionnaire 
packet.
In the spaces below, please list the personal goals that you are presently pursuing and 
will be pursuing during the next month, according to the type of goal. Please list goals 
that describe, as accurately and completely as possible, what you are typically trying 
to do in your daily life. Of course, some of the goal types will apply to you more so 
than others. Nevertheless, please be sure to list 2 goals o f  each type, even i f  some o f  
the goal types are not as important to you.
Please read the directions in the questionnaire packet carefully before 
completing this page. 
Achievement — approach
Goal
# 1:_________________________________________________________________
Goal
# 2 :___________________________________________________________________________
Achievement -  avoidance (note: this doesn’t mean “avoidance of achievement”; see 
directions)
Goal
#3:______________________________________________________________
Goal
#4:______________________________________________________________
Affiliation — approach
Goal
#5:______________________________________________________________
Goal
#6: ___________
Affiliation — avoidance (note: this doesn’t mean “avoidance of affiliation”; see 
directions)
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Goal 
#7:_______
Goal
#8:
Power — approach
Goal
#9:______________________________________________________________
Goal
# 10:___________________________________________________________________
Power — avoidance (note: this doesn’t mean “avoidance of power”; see directions) 
Goal
# 11:
Goal
#12:
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APPENDIX C
Personal Goals: Directions
Next you will be providing information about your “personal goals” -  that is, the 
things that you are typically or characteristically trying to do in your daily life.
Achievement, affiliation, and power goals
Most personal goals may be classified into one of the following categories:
* Achievement goals are focused on succeeding (or doing well), or avoiding 
failure (or doing poorly)
* Affiliation goals are focused on friendly relationships with others, or 
avoiding
rejection by others
* Power goals are focused on having an impact on or power over other people, 
or avoiding being controlled or overpowered by others
Approach and avoidance goals
Regardless of whether a goal is focused on achievement, affiliation, or power, it may 
also be classified in terms of approach and avoidance:
* Approach goals are focused on getting or maintaining something positive.
* Avoidance goals are focused on preventing or getting rid o f  something 
negative.
Goal listing task
Combining the distinctions above produces 6 specific types of goals, as shown below. 
Please think about the personal goals that you are presently pursuing and will be 
pursuing during the next month. On the separate sheet entitled, “Listing of personal 
goals,” please list 12 goals of the following types:
Goal type Example
Goals 1 and 2: achievement-approach “to improve my grades”
Goals 3 and 4: achievement-avoidance “to avoid losing tennis matches”
Goals 5 and 6: affiliation-approach “to keep things happy with my
girlfriend”
Goals 7 and 8: affiliation-avoidance “to avoid angering my roommate”
Goals 9 and 10: power-approach “to become a leader in my sorority”
Goals 11 and 12: power-avoidance “to stop letting others make decisions for
me.”
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Once you have listed your 12 goals on the separate sheet, you may continue this 
questionnaire packet.
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APPENDIX D 
PERSONAL GOAL RATINGS 
Please answer the following questions for each of your 12 personal goals:
I. Im portance. How important is each goal to you at present?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not at all im portant very im portant
Goal #1 (achievement-approach): ____
Goal #2 (achievement-approach): ____
Goal #3 (achievement-avoidance):______
Goal #4 (achievement-avoidance): ____
Goal #5 (affiliation-approach): ____
Goal #6 (affiliation-approach): ____
Goal #7 (affiliation-avoidance): ____
Goal #8 (affiliation-avoidance): ____
Goal #9 (power-approach): ____
Goal #10 (power-approach): ____
Goal #11 (power-avoidance): ____
Goal # 12 (power-avoidance): ___
II. Overall investment. How much of your attention, time, and energy do you intend 
to invest in each goal during the next week?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
none a great deal
Goal #1 (achievement-approach): ____
Goal #2 (achievement-approach): ____
Goal #3 (achievement-avoidance): ____
Goal #4 (achievement-avoidance): ____
Goal #5 (affiliation-approach): ____
Goal #6 (affiliation-approach): ____
Goal #7 (affiliation-avoidance): ____
Goal #8 (affiliation-avoidance): ____
Goal #9 (power-approach): ____
Goal #10 (power-approach): ____
Goal #11 (power-avoidance): ____
Goal #12 (power-avoidance): ____
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III. Effort. How much effort do you intend to put forth toward each goal during the 
next week?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
none a great deal
Goal #1 (achievement-approach): ____
Goal #2 (achievement-approach):_______
Goal #3 (achievement-avoidance): ____
Goal #4 (achievement-avoidance):______
Goal #5 (affiliation-approach): ____
Goal #6 (affiliation-approach): ____
Goal #7 (affiliation-avoidance):____ ____
Goal #8 (affiliation-avoidance): ____
Goal #9 (power-approach):________ ____
Goal #10 (power-approach): ____
Goal #11 (power-avoidance): ____
Goal #12 (power-avoidance): ____
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APPENDIX E
SATISFACTION WITH LIFE SCALE
Using the following scale, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements regarding how you have felt today.. Please circle 
your answers.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly neither agree
strongly
disagree nor disagree agree
Today, I have felt that...
1. .. .in most ways, my life is close to ideal. 1 2 3 4 5 6
7
2. .. .the conditions of my life are excellent. 1 2 3 4 5 6
7
3. ...I am satisfied with my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6
7
4. .. .if I could live my life over, I would change 1 2 3 4 5 6
7
almost nothing.
5. .. .1 have gotten the important things I want 1 2 3 4 5 6
7
in life.
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APPENDIX F 
MINDFULNESS
Instructions: Below is a collection of statements about your every day 
experience. Using the 1-6 scale below, please indicate how frequently or 
infrequently you currently have each experience. Please answer according to 
what really reflects your experience rather than what you think your experience 
should be. Please treat each item separately from every other item.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Almost Very Somewhat Somewhat Very
Almost
Always Frequently Frequently Infrequently Infrequently Never
I could be experiencing some emotion and not be 
conscious of it until some time later.
1
6
2 3 4 5
I break or spill things because of carelessness, not 
paying attention, or thinking o f something else.
1
6
2 3 4 5
I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening 
in the present.
1
6
2 3 4 5
I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m going without 
paying attention to what I experience along the way.
1
6
2 3 4 5
I tend not to notice feelings o f physical tension or 
discomfort until they really grab my attention.
1
6
2 3 4 5
I forget a person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been 
told it for the first time.
1
6
2 3 4 5
It seems I am “running on automatic,” without much 
awareness of what Pm doing.
1
6
2 3 4 5
I rush through activities without being really attentive 
to them.
1
6
2 3 4 5
I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I 
lose touch with what I’m doing right now to get there.
1
6
2 3 4 5
I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware 
of what I’m doing.
1
6
2 3 4 5
I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing 
something else at the same time.
1
6
2 3 4 5
I drive places on ‘automatic pilot’ and then wonder 
why I went there.
1
6
2 3 4 5
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1 2 3 4 5I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past. 6
I find myself doing things without paying attention. 16
2 3 4 5
I snack without being aware that I’m eating. 16
2 3 4 5
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APPENDIX G 
PROCTOR SCRIPTS
Session 1:
Hi, Pm Anne Hurst, a second year masters student in psychology, and I am 
conducting this study for my masters thesis. I am going to defend this research in 
May to complete the program. It would definitely be good to graduate! So please take 
this study seriously.
This study will involve five questionnaire sessions, once a week for 5 questionnaire 
sessions, once a week for five weeks. We ask that you only begin this study if you 
expect that you will be available for all five sessions. All of your credit will be given 
at the end of the study.
Today’s session will take a little less than one hour, and the remaining four sessions 
will take approximately a half an hour or a little more. I would encourage you to no 
schedule or plan something directly after the upcoming sessions incase it takes you a 
little more than 30 minutes to finish. All of these sessions will sum to three hours 
total.
Now, I will read through the informed consent with you. There are two copies. One is 
for our records and one is for your own. (Experimenter reads informed consent aloud 
to participants.) Does anyone have any questions? If you choose to participate, please 
sign both consent forms and I will collect one of them. (Experimenter collects 
informed consents.)
Now, I want to make a few comments about the questionnaire:
1. There are some items that may seem repetitive, these aren’t put there to waste 
your time or torture you! In psychological research it is crucial to see whether a 
certain set of items do or do not measure the same idea.
2. Again, please take this questionnaire seriously and respond as accurately and 
honestly as possible. You have full confidentiality
3. Don’t feel daunted by the thickness of the questionnaire packet. It should not 
be too exhausting
4. Please remember to put your email address at the top of the questionnaire 
packet, and the separate page in your envelope. Again, you have full 
confidentiality guaranteed.
Now I will pass out the questionnaires. (Experimenter passes out questionnaire 
packets.) Please turn off your cell phones and do not discuss the questionnaire. I’ll be 
outside the door, so please bring your questionnaire to me when you are finished. And
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if you have any questions at all about any of the materials, feel free to come ask me at 
any time. Thanks.
Session 2 - 3 :
Thanks again for participating in our study. This session will take approximately 30. 
minutes. I will pass out the questionnaires. Please take the questionnaire that 
corresponds with your email address. (Experimenter passes out questionnaire 
packets.) Again, please respond as accurately and honestly as possible. Please turn off 
your cell phones and do not talk amongst yourselves or discuss the questionnaire.
And please do not forget to put your email address at the top of the questionnaire 
packet. Til be outside the door, so please bring your questionnaire to me when you 
are finished. And if you have any questions, feel free to come and ask at any time. 
Thanks.
Session 4:
Thanks again for participating in our study. I would like to remind you that this study 
is for my masters’ thesis, and you will receive more information about the purpose of 
this study at the end of your next session. I would also like to say that there is a 
purpose behind the administration of the questionnaires in this research, so please 
take all of the questions seriously, and answer the questions as requested in the 
instructions for each measure. For example, please note when the instructions say 
“today” or “this week”. So, this session will take approximately 30 minutes. I will pas 
out the questionnaires. Please take the questionnaire that corresponds with your email 
address. (Experimenter passes out questionnaire packets.) Again, please respond as 
accurately and honestly as possible. And please do not forget to put your email 
address at the top of the questionnaire packet. I will wait until all questionnaire 
packets are dispersed, so please wait to being until I’ve left the room. I’ll be outside 
the door, so please bring your questionnaire to me when you are finished. And if  you 
have any questions, feel free to come and ask at any time. Thanks.
Session 5:
Thanks again for participating in our study. This session will takie approximately 30 
minutes. I will pass out the questionnaires. I will wait until all of the questionnaires 
are distributed. Please wait until I have left the room to begin on your packet. 
(Experimenter passes out questionnaire packets.) Again, please respond as accurately 
and honestly as possible. Please turn off your cell phones, please do not discuss the 
questionnaire, and please do not talk amongst yourselves. I’ll be outside the door, so 
bring your questionnaire to me when you are finished. At that point, I’ll give you one 
follow-up question and a brief description of the study. And if you have any 
questions, feel free to come ask at any time. Thanks.
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APPENDIX H 
INFORMED CONSENT
The College o f  W illiam  & M ary
Departm ent o f  Psychology  
P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg VA 23187-8795 
757-221-3870 fax 757-221-3896
Consent form: Goals and Personality
I ,_______________________________________ , agree to participate in a
study of personality, “everyday” experiences, and well-being. The purpose of this 
study is to examine the ways in which personality, experiences, and well-being 
interact across time.
I understand that I will be asked to attend five sessions, each a week apart. 
These five sessions will span a 4-week period. At each session, I will be asked to 
complete questionnaires about my personality, goals, experiences, and well-being.
The first session will take approximately 1 hour, and the remaining four sessions will 
take roughly 30 minutes each, for a total time commitment of 3 hours.
I understand that I will receive 3 hours of research participation credit to apply 
toward my research participation requirement in my introductory psychology course.
I understand that my email address will be used in order to link my five sets of 
data together and to contact me about upcoming sessions. Upon completion of the 
study, my email address will be removed from the data sets in order to maximize 
confidentiality and anonymity. The researchers will take other standard measures to 
ensure confidentiality, such as storing data in a locked room.
I understand that no personal risk or harm to participants is expected, and that 
I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue participation in this study at any 
time, without negative consequences. However, I am also aware that the 
compensation that I receive for my participation (research participation credit for my 
introductory psychology course) will be granted in proportion to how much of the 
study that I complete.
If I have any questions or if problems arise in connection with my 
participation in this study, I may contact Anne Hurst (alhurs@wm.edu; 917-690- 
4098), director of this research project, or Glenn Shean (gdshea@wm.edu, 221-3886), 
chair of the human subjects ethics committee in the psychology department at the 
College of William & Mary.
My signature below signifies that I am at least 18 years of age and that I have 
received a copy of this consent form.
Date:
Name (printed):
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Signature of participant:___________________________________________
THIS PROJECT WAS FOUND TO COMPLY WITH APPROPRIATE ETHICAL 
STANDARDS AND WAS EXEMPTED FROM THE NEED FOR FORMAL 
REVIEW BY THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE (Phone 757-221-3901) ON 2005-09-30 AND 
EXPIRES ON 2005-12-25.
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APPENDIX I
FOLLOW-UP QUESTION
Please indicate in the space below your thoughts as to what the questions concerning 
the pictures were trying to assess:
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APPENDIX J 
DEBRIEFING
The purpose of this study was to assess the congruence between motive and 
goals for individuals across time. This research stems from the logic that we have 
both underlying motivations and explicit goals, and the two of these may or may not 
compliment each other. Thus, by having a longitudinal study assessing motivation 
and goal endorsement over the period of five weeks, we not only can see whether 
congruence varies across time, but also attempt to find a direction of causality 
between congruence and other variables, such as well-being and mindfulness to name 
a few. If you have any questions about this research you can contact Anne Hurst at 
alhurs@wm.edu. Also, if you want information about the results of this study you 
may contact Anne Hurst in 3 to 4 months. Thank you again for your participation.
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